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INDUSTRIAL BONDS
LOCAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND FINANCING
The use of industrial development bonds issued by local governments
has grown considerably in the past decade. In 1953 only six states'. author-
ized local governments to issue them. By 1961 the number had increased
to sixteen.2 Today the total stands at thirty-one.' This spectacular rise in
the use of industrial development bonds 4 has made the adverse effects of
these programs more apparent. Three main proposals have been suggested
to alleviate the problem: (1) Amendment of Section 103 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954." (2) modification of the Treasury Department's
Revenue Rulings," and (3) enactment of uniform model state enabling legis-
lation.' The purpose of this article will be to examine the operation of local
industrial development bond programs, to analyze the proposals which
have been made, and to propose an effective and desirable solution to the
problems which will be discussed below.
I. OPERATION OF LOCAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND PROGRAMS
The local governments in thirty-one states are presently authorized
to issue industrial development bonds purportedly "to relieve conditions
of unemployment . . . and to encourage the increase of industry within
[the] state, thereby reducing the evils attendant upon unemployment." 8
The validity of this enabling legislation is well settled." The bond authoriza-
tions have been for either general obligation and/or revenue bonds. The
general obligation bonds pledge the credit of the local government, while
the revenue bonds are backed only by the income from the project.
1 Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee.
2 Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin.
3 Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.
4 "Through the first half of 1965, the Investment Bankers Association estimates
$729 million of municipal bonds have been issued." Of this total $178,627,000 were
issued in 1964 alone. This represents a twenty-fold increase from the 1957 total of
$7,612,000. Lechner, Industrial Aid Financing 6 (1965).
5 Speech by Representative Henry S. Reuss, cited in American Industrial Develop-
ment Council, Professional Notes No. 5, PN 3 (1964) (hereinafter cited as A.I.D.C.).
Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures With Tax Exempt Bonds: A Developing
"Truckhole" in the Tax Law, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 224 (1965).
7 Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, 1964 at 51 (1963).
8 See, e.g., Ill, Ann. Stat. ch. 24 § 11-74-3 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
9
 See generally 70 Yale L.J. 789 (1961); .59 Colum, L. Rev. 618 (1959). In order
to effectuate these programs many states have found it necessary to amend their state
constitution when it restricts the state or its political subdivisions from using the public
credit to finance private ventures. For example, Mass. Const. art. LXII § 1 provides,
"The credit of the Commonwealth shall not in any manner he given or loaned to, or
in aid of any individual or any private association, or any corporation which is
privately owned or managed." Because of this prohibition Massachusetts has not
enacted an industrial development bond program. However, an attempt is presently
being made to amend the state constitution to permit such an enactment.
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Typically, a municipality sells a bond issue to raise capital to construct
facilities for a proposed industry. The bonds are amortized over a thirty
to forty year period with the rental payments for the use of the facility
being used to pay off the debt. The local government is the owner of the
facility subject to the debt.
The industry, the local government and the bondholder each profit
from these programs. These benefits derive from the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 which provides that: "Gross income does not include interest
on (1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the
United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing. .. ." 11:1
Thus the income on the bonds is not taxable. This makes the bonds attractive
to persons in the higher income brackets even though the bonds bear
a relatively low interest rate. This low interest rate in effect allows the
local government to borrow money at a lower rate than is available to
private interests. In addition, the local government pays no income tax
on the rental payments,11 and the rental payment is a valid deductible
business expense to the industry. 12 Since the local government is the owner
of the facility, the property is also not subject to any local property taxes.
Thus, the industry pays an unusually low rental rate for the constructed
facility and the local government can look forward to owning the buildings
free and clear after the bonds have been amortized, while presently enjoying
an increase of jobs and personal income in the area.
II. INCREASED LIBERALITY AND USE
The "grandfather" of local industrial development bond financing is
Mississippi's 1936 Balance Agriculture With Industry (BAWI) plan.13
It was designed to strengthen the economy of a highly agriculturally
oriented state. The act, stating that "the present and prospective health,
safety, morale, pursuit of happiness, right to gainful employment and
general welfare of its citizens demand, as a public purpose, the development
within Mississippi of industrial and manufacturing enterprises," 14 was upheld
by the state supreme court, 15
 although the state constitution expressly for-
bade the state or municipality to extend its credit to finance a private
enterprise. 16
The program authorized the local governments to issue general obliga-
tion bonds subject to the approval of a state authority which carefully
screened all applications. Though criticized," the central authority was
indeed necessary. These general obligation bonds pledged the local govern-
ment's credit in support of the bonds. Unlike revenue bonds, where the risk
to the bondholder depends upon the strength of the industry, general obliga-
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § , 103(a).
11
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 115(a)(2).
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a) (3).
is Moos, Local Subsidies for Industry 71-80 (1962).
14
 Miss. Code Ann. § 8936(5) (1957).
Allbriton v. Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 627
(1938).
10 Miss. Const. art. 14, § 258 (1957).
17
 Moes, supra note 13, at 76.
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tion bonds are relatively risk free since the bondholder's income is assured
whether the industry succeeds or fails. Since the investment was guaranteed,
the programs might have attracted marginal industries which could have
failed, leaving the local government with the burden of paying off the obliga-
tion. The fact that Mississippi has had so few failures attests to the soundness
of the arrangement.' 5
Recent state programs have incorporated the benefits of industrial de-
velopment bond planning without the safeguards found in the BAWI program.
These subsequent enactments authorized the issuance of revenue bonds by
the • local government without the approval of a state authority.' One
statute went considerably further. It authorized the local government to
purchase an out-of-state industry and transplant it in the community
through use of local revenue bond issues. 2° To protect their own industry
from being pirated, states have been forced to further extend the use of
local bond issues to finance improvement and expansion of existing facili-
ties.21
A series of revenue rulings by the Treasury Department construing Sec-
tion 103 of the Internal Revenue Code has aided the rapid growth of these
industrial development bond programs. In 1954 the "interest on bonds
issued by a municipality to finance construction of municipally owned
industrial plants for lease to private enterprises" was declared tax exempt. 22
The fact that the bonds might be revenue bonds where the promise to pay
is limited only to the income derived from leasing the property rather than
general obligation bonds which pledge the municipal credit was declared
immaterial.23
 In 1957 bonds issued by an Industrial Development Board
were "considered issued in behalf of a municipality, a political subdivision
of the State," thus exempting their interest from the federal income tax. 24
The next step was taken in 1963 when interest on the obligations of non-
profit corporations was declared excludable from gross income where the
corporation was organized "for the purpose of stimulating industrial de-
velopment within a political subdivision of the state." 25
Despite their widespread use, there has been some question as to the
effect of industrial development bond programs. Today it is becoming in-
creasingly clear that they are not only an effective inducement to industry
in determining a location within a particular region, but also make expan-
sion economically feasible for industries which otherwise could not afford
18 The State Industrial Board reports that "tax monies bad to be used to fulfill a
company's obligation" only three times in the past ten years. Lechner, supra note 4.
13
 E.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-1705 (1955); Ala. Code tit. 37, § 511(20)-(32) (1959).
20 N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-41-31 to -43 (Supp. 1959), constitutionality upheld in
Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956), subsequently re-
pealed by Laws 1965, ch. 300 § 595.
21 see
, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 37, § 511(20)-(32) (1959), as amended, § 511(22)
(1963).
22




 Rev. Rul. 57-187, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 65.
25 Rev, Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 Cum. Bull. 24.
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to do so. As recent as 1958 when the first study of the effects of these
programs was made, tax factors and financial aid ranked near the bottom
of the list of factors which influenced management's location decision."
Labor markets and materials were the prime factors. But in the next seven
years as industrial aid financing became increasingly popular in the states,
it was recognized that the effect of local development bond programs was
increasing. The New England Business Review, in recognizing the "loca-
tional effect," stated that "although not sufficiently influential to draw an
industry to a region, such programs may be responsible for plants in a
particular community within a region." 27
 The Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations further noted the "stimulus effect," stating
that "industrial development bonds may make it possible for firms to inno-
vate and expand that otherwise would remain static." 28 A 1965 study" which
surveyed twenty-six recently located firms in the southern United States
supported these statements. Twenty of the firms interviewed stated that
although labor, markets and materials were key factors in determining
industrial location, they would not have been able to expand without in-
dustrial aid financing. 30 Since the industrial aid stimulated the expansion,
the new location of the industry would necessarily be in an area which
offered such a program.
Many states offer alternative industrial aid programs either through
direct loans, state-wide credit agencies, or mortgage guarantees." The
federal government also offers financial aid through the Small Business Ad-
ministration32
 and the Economic Development Act of 1965." The federal
programs give especially low interest rates to areas which qualify as labor
•surplus areas. These programs were recently compared to determine the
annual cost of financing a $1,000,000 industrial facility over a twenty-year
period." Typical state programs were used. The results were that the
federal program would cost the industry $67,780 yearly, whereas the munici-
pal bond plan would cost $79,200 yearly. The other results were: State loan
plan—$76,080; state credit agency—$82,308; and mortgage guarantee plan
—$89,586.
Although the federal program appears to be more attractive than a
local bond program, it was pointed out that in Rhode Island the financially
less attractive mortgage guarantee plan was used twenty-seven times during a
period in which the federal program (ARA) was used only once.33
 The close
26
 Bergin, "Critical Analysis of the Effect of State Aid to Industry in Selected
Areas" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Syracuse University, 1958).
27 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, New England Business Review, July 1964, p. 4.
28
 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Industrial Aid Financing
72 (1963).
20
 Lechner, Industrial Aid Financing 49-58 (1965).
30
 Id. at 51.
31
 For a tabular summary of the industrial aid programs offered by the various
states, see Schmidt, Local Facilities Financing and a Comparison of Financing Plans,
A.LD.C. No. 5, at PN 12 (1965).
82 72 Stat. 186 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 633 (1964).
33
 79 Stat. 552 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 3121 (1964).
34 Schmidt, supra note 31, at PN 7.
35
 Id. at PN 10-11.
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regulation and numerous restrictions36 placed on the federal programs partially
explain this. However, the key factor is the delay" in getting the federal
agencies' approval of a proposal. Speed in obtaining funds is usually of the
essence in selecting a program. It should also be noted that each of the
annual cost figures is well below the conventional charge an industry would
expect to pay."
As compared with the other state programs, the big advantage that the
municipal bond plan has to the state is that it uses in part federal money
rather than state money to finance the industrial development. Thus, the
municipal bond plan is a very useful device for a state to have available.
A. Adverse Ef ects
Local industrial development bond programs have had adverse effects
on all levels of government. From the federal point of view the programs
(1) use federal funds to finance local industrial development, (2) permit
the local government to control the use of the federal money, (3) break
down the progressive income tax structure, and (4) decrease the tax base.
As between the states, these programs are used both to attract industry
seeking a new location and to pirate industry existing in other states.
Although competition between the states for industry appears to be healthy,
this'is so only where the industry is itself seeking a new location and not when
the industry is pirated from another state. A pirated industry which fills a
local employment need, leaves the same problem behind in the area which it
left.39
Although the intrastate problems are limited, these bond programs (1)
create unfair competition for competitors who do not enjoy a similar low
rental, and (2) permit, in some cases, expansion of facilities beyond the needs
of the community," thus attracting labor from other areas. This may well
'result in the program's failure with a consequent impairment of the local
government's credit. 41
Furthermore, the bond programs are sometimes used to finance industry
that is in a sound financial position and could use conventional financing
facilities,'" and also to finance department stores 'and other activities which
bear no relation to industrial development." One of the most objectionable
uses occurs whenever a lessee of the facility purchases the bonds itself,"
36 Id. at PN 6.
Jrt Ibid.
89 Id. at PN 10.
80 A.I.D.C., supra note 5, at PN 5.
40 Ibid.
41 Especially where general obligation bonds are involved on which the local
government must then make payment.
42 Such firms as American Machine and Foundry, Olin-Mathieson, and United
States Rubber have taken advantage of municipal bond plans to finance their expansion.
Lechner, supra note 4, at 7.
43 Topeka, Kansas issued a $3,700,000 revenue bond issue to finance a department
store for Macy's. The income on these bonds was tax exempt. A1.D.C., supra note 5,
at PN 5.
44 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations suggested that
Congress act to prevent this misuse of industrial development bond issues. Advisory
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thus enjoying all the tax benefits" and indicating that it possessed the
monies to finance the facilities in the first place.
• The continued misuse and growth of local industrial development bond
financing plans pose even greater problems for the future.
(1) The programs are defeating themselves through competition."
The increased popularity of the programs. has forced more and more states
to enact them as a defensive measure. Eventually each state will have a
program and the programs will thus lose much of their effectiveness.
(2) The programs tend to favor the financially stronger industries"
since the attractiveness of a revenue bond issue depends on the financial
strength of the incoming industry. Also, since the interest on the bonds
varies with the risk involved, financing becomes less expensive for the in-
dustry which is in a strong financial position.
(3) The erosion in the federal tax base increases directly with the
growth of the programs."
(4) The programs artificially stimulate development in areas which
are not otherwise the most efficient location for the industry in terms of
markets, materials and productivity. As the programs grow, so will this
adverse effect on the efficiency of the economy. 40
(5) As the adverse effects become more prevalent the pressures on the
Congress will increase to eliminate the programs entirely.
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Industrial Development Bond Financing
31 (1963)
45 In effect, the industry would make a rental payment which would be a deductible
business expense. It would then be returned by the city to the industry as tax free
income on the bonds. For example:
A municipality issued $400,000 in 30-year tax-exempt revenue bonds at
an interest rate of 534 per cent per annum. It sold all the bonds to a corpora-
tion desiring a $400,000 plant, and used the proceeds to build the plant to
order for the corporation, The corporation then signed a lease renting the
plant for 30 years at an annual rental of approximately $28,000, with a renewal
option for another 30 years or more at $1 per year.
The corporation's rent of $28,000 per year, a wholly deductible business
expense, helped to reduce its income tax to the extent of 52 per cent of the
rental cost. Only 48 per cent of the $28,000 or $13,400 can be considered, there-
fore, as the true rental cost. But in the first year under this arrangement, the
corporation also earned $28,000 in tax-exempt interest. Therefore, that year the
corporation got rent free premises and made a profit of $9,560, the difference
between $23,000 interest income and $13,440 in rental cost. Over the entire
30-year period, the Investment Bankers Association points out, in addition to
free rent of a new plant, the corporation would pile up a profit of $48,074 on
its $400,000 investment,
A.I.D.C., supra note 5, at PN 4.
46
 Sparks & Pate, Revenue Bonds and an Approach to a Fair Appraisal, A.I.D.C.
No. 6, PN 5 (1964) ; A.I.D.C. supra note 5, at PN 6.
47
 Sparks & Pate, supra note 46.
48
 This decrease is partially offset by the increase in taxable personal income in
the area.
45 Sparks & Pate, supra note 46.
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II. A LOOK AT THE PROPOSALS
The need for control has prompted proposals for action by the Congress,
the Treasury Department and the states. Past Congressional attempts have
been aimed directly at modifying Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. There have been two types of proposed legislation: (1) To disallow
the deduction of the rental payments from the industry's taxable income, 50
and (2) to tax the interest paid on industrial development bonds. 5I
Neither type of legislation has met with favor, although the House
version of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 "included a provision pro-
hibiting the deduction of rent paid for the use of property acquired or im-
proved by the issue of so-called industrial development revenue bonds (where
the credit of the municipality was not pledged), but the Senate would not
agree and the provision was eliminated." 52 It was deleted only because
of disagreement over whether denial of the rental deduction •to revenue
bonds would be an effective way to prevent abuses of the programs. 52 Pro-
posals in 1961,54 and 1963 55 and 19645° to disallow the deduction of the
industry's rental payment and to tax the income on the bonds were not
reported out of the House Ways and Means Committee.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Regulations recom-
mended in its 1963 report that federal action be taken to prevent industries
from buying the bonds themselves, thereby enjoying all the tax benefits. 57
Certainly this usage must be prevented, but such action alone is far too
limited. It would attack only one abuse of the programs which has been
quite limited up to this time.
The liberal position of the Treasury Department was previously noted. 58
Revenue Ruling 63-20 59
 has been referred to by one author as "a blueprint
for issuance of tax exempt bonds to finance private ventures." 80 It provided
that bonds issued by non-profit corporations chartered in compliance with
applicable state law would be tax exempt. The only limitations imposed were
that (1) the corporation's activities be public in nature and non-profit, (2)
the income not inure to a private individual, (3) the state or political sub-
division have a beneficial interest and obtain full legal title to the facility
when the indebtedness is retired, and (4) the issuance of the obligations
be approved by the state or political subdivision thereof. By this ruling the
Treasury Department extended the tax exemptions granted conventional
50
 H.R. 10547, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) ; H.R. 6772, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ;
H.R. 6368, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
51
 H.R. 517, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; H.R. 798, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
52
 Bittker, Federal Income, Estate and Gilt Taxation 160 (3rd ed. 1965).
53 S. Rep. No. 1662, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1954).
54 H.R. 6368, H.R. 798, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
55
 H.R. 6772, H.R. 517, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
56
 H.R. 10547, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
57 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Industrial Development
Bond Financing 31 (1963).
58 Supra p. 698.
59 Supra note 25.
60 Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures with Tax Exempt Bonds; A Developing
"Truckhole" in the Tax Law, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 224, 227 (1965).
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methods of local industrial development bond financing to non-profit corpo-
rations approved by the local government. This revenue ruling may even
permit the issuance of local industrial development bonds in the absence
of enabling legislation. 61-
This "developing `truckhole' in the tax law" prompted Hart H.
Spiegel, the former chief counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, to urge a
change in the Treasury Department's liberal attitude. 82 His criticisms were
directed at the bonds issued by non-profit corporations authorized by the
state or political subdivision thereof. This is merely a sophisticated form
of the industrial development bond which was authorized by Revenue Ruling
63-20. In these plans the municipality holds the beneficial interest in the
non-profit corporation which issues the bonds, rather than issuing the bonds
itself as in the conventional plans. However, the criticism is equally ap-
plicable to industrial bond programs in general since the programs are
essentially the same.
Spiegel suggests that the liberal rulings of the Internal Revenue Service
regarding these programs are not necessitated by Section 103 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. The exemption granted under section 103(a) is
limited to the "obligations of" the state and its political subdivisions. The
Treasury Regulations interpret this as meaning obligations issued on "behalf
of" the state or political subdivision thereof 83
From this starting point, it is clear that the income on any bond issue
which is issued "on behalf" of a local government is tax exempt. This would
include industrial development bonds, whatever their purpose. Such a
position goes too far. The time has come for the Treasury Department to
re-evaluate their position of interpreting section 103 as exempting the
income on any bond issued "on behalf of" the state or its political sub-
divisions. As an example of the absurdity of this position, one need only
consider industrial revenue bonds. They are not supported by the taxing
power of the local government. Thus they are not obligations of the state or
its political subdivision. Many state courts have so held in order to avoid
conflicts with "credit clauses" in state constitutions." Yet, because of
Treasury Regulation Section 1-103-1 (1956) interpreting "obligation of" as
meaning "on behalf of," the income on each of these bond issues must be
granted tax exempt status.
There is no valid reason why the income on every bond issue of a state
or its political subdivisions must be declared tax exempt. A "public purpose"
test could be required of each bond issue in order for its income to qualify
for the tax exempt status. Industrial development in qualified areas could
be included within the definition of a "public purpose." Such an exemption
in "It is not known to what extent non-profit corporations are taking advantage
of this ruling. Several issues under this ruling have been made in North Carolina."
North Carolina does not have legislation authorizing municipal industrial bonds.
Schmidt, supra note 31, at PN 4.
82
 Spiegel, supra note 60, at 228.
63 Treas. Reg. § 1-103-1 (1956).
64 See, e.g., Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80 (1950).
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would be in the spirit of the seemingly limited exemption granted by section
103, and would eliminate clearly abusive bond issues since no one would
buy them knowing that the Internal Revenue Service would not be re-
quired to allow ipso facto the tax exemption on their interest. However,
unilateral action by the Treasury is beset with numerous problems. A "public
purpose" test would be difficult to define satisfactorily. Furthermore, who
would determine the status of each bond issue and when would this determi-
nation be made? Would the ruling on the status of the bonds be made at the
time of issue or would it be required to wait until a buyer sought a tax
exemption? What of the long delay period between rulings and appeals?
Such questions and delays would not make these bond issues attractive. Al-
though Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code does not prohibit the
Treasury Department from initiating action to control industrial development
bond financing, this action would not be desirable. The Treasury Depart-
ment's interest would be in preserving the tax base, not in developing the
program as a whole. However, the possible exercise of this power should
serve as a caveat to interested parties that, if the abuses do continue
unchecked, this unilateral action on the part of the Treasury Department
could be instituted.
The Council of State Governments, in its Program of Suggested State
Legislation, 1964,85
 took' another approach to regulate the local industrial
development bond financing programs. It proposed that each state author-
izing these bond issues enact further legislation providing safeguards so
that the programs are "conducted in such a manner as to make a maximum
contribution to the orderly industrial development of . the state."" The main
feature of the proposed legislation is that a state supervising agency would
be established to authorize the bond issues. This agency would select which
areas would be eligible, giving priority to those which suffered from chronic
surplus labor and which lacked conventional credit channels. Such an agency
could limit the amount of the bond issues and also prevent expansion beyond
present needs, thus preventing intra-state piracy of industry and labor. By
the standard set in the legislation, only certain areas would be eligible for
the programs. They would be limited to the areas where the industrial de-
velopment was lagging far behind the area's needs. This proposal provides
the proper safeguards and protects not only the state's own interests, but
also the federal interest regarding the tax subsidy which it extends to
these programs. Furthermore, it justifies the use of the federal tax subsidy
to finance private industrial developments. However, the beneficial effect of
such legislation would depend upon each state's willingness to enact the
safeguards. The key to the success of the Advisory Commission proposal is
uniformity. Yet the proposal itself lacks the coercion necessary to make the
states act, and it is unlikely that they would act unilaterally since amending
their own programs without a guarantee that the other states will do the
same runs too great a risk of incurring a competitive disadvantage.
05
 Council on State Governments, Program of Suggested State Legislation, 1964,
at 51 (1963).




One of the main problems confronting attempts at the proper use of
local industrial development bond programs is the sharply conflicting in-
terests of the parties involved. The federal government is concerned with
the loss of tax base. The state is interested in getting the maximum federal
subsidy without incurring the intra-state abuses. The local government
merely wants industrial development. When these programs are misused
by the local government, it suffers the least; this is also the level of govern-
ment which gains the greatest benefits from the programs, whether they
are used correctly or not. Yet, the control over these programs in most
states is in the hands of those who stand to gain the most and lose the
least—the local governments.
If the practice of local industrial development bond financing is to be
continued, the control over it must be removed from the local level to
insure that the , programs will be used for the proper purposes. The desired
result would be a program which struck a balance between the tax subsidy
which the federal government grants and the socio-economic rejuvenation
of the depressed areas where the programs are used. Such a balance would
justify not only the federal tax subsidy, but also the use of public funds
to finance private industry.
A program is needed which coerces the states into enacting the safe-
guards suggested by the Advisory Commission. It is clear that only action
on the federal level can do this. But federal control raises the problems of
delays and excessive paper work which reduces the effectiveness of any
industrial development program. To avoid these problems Congress should
establish a commission which would enforce certain minimum federal
standards controlling who is eligible for the subsidy and to what area it goes.
These standards would insure that the use of the public funds was within
the public purpose requirement. This commission might be set up in a
manner similar to that set up by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 67
It would police and enforce the federal standards, but it would defer to any
state which showed that it could operate its own program' within the
prescribed standards. Such a program would make effective use of industrial
development bonds, and it would coerce the states to enact minimum
standards in order for their local bond issues to be eligible for the federal
tax exemptions.
Congress has not acted favorably in the past regarding proposals to
control industrial development bond financing. The past proposals, how-
ever, would have eliminated the attractiveness of industrial development
bond programs. The present proposal merely limits the use of the programs
and does not impair their effectiveness. The competition between the states
for industry is increasing. As more states enact industrial development bond
programs, they will become ineffective as an inducement. The time has come
for a compromise solution which will not only preserve this industrial aid
device, but also justify its use.
WILLIAM L. MAY, JR.
67
 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1964).
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